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Overview of the case 
In PP v Kamrul Hasan Abdul Quddus,1 the accused was charged with 
murder. He and the deceased had been in a tumultuous relationship, and 
the main evidence that connected the deceased’s death to the accused, 
apart from the fact that her body was found in the construction site that 
the accused worked at, was that DNA taken from her rectum tested 
positive for semen that matched his DNA.  
Despite this and the presence of other pieces of circumstantial evidence, 
the accused submitted no case to answer at trial. When the trial judge 
(Justice Kan) called on him to enter his defence, he elected to remain 
silent and did not call on any witnesses to testify for him. Of present 
interest is that Justice Kan not only held that the evidence adduced by 
the prosecution was sufficient to convict the accused, he further held 
that the various lies and inconsistencies in the accused’s Investigation 
Statements to the police (see [37] of his decision) corroborated the other 
evidence that proved his guilt. The Court of Appeal, in dismissing the 
accused’s appeal,2 affirmed the principles and conclusion set out by 
Justice Kan on the said issue of corroboration. It fully adopted [47]–
[54] of his decision, which can be summarised as follows: 
(a) Regina v Lucas (Ruth) [1981] QB 720 (“Lucas”) held at 724 
that: “To be capable of amounting to corroboration the lie told 
out of court must first of all be deliberate. Secondly it must 
relate to a material issue. Thirdly the motive for the lie must be 
a realisation of guilt and a fear of the truth… Fourthly the 
statement must be clearly shown to be a lie by evidence other 
than that of the accomplice who is to be corroborated…” Lucas 
was applied locally in PP v Yeo Choon Poh [1994] 2 SLR 867. 
There, it was said at 876 that “lies can in certain circumstances 
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amount to corroboration because it indicates a consciousness of 
guilt.” 
(b) While corroboration is required for some forms of evidence 
(such as evidence of victims of sexual offences), any form of 
evidence can be strengthened by corroboration. Lucas does not 
only apply in situations where there is a special requirement for 
corroboration. 
(c) PP v Chee Cheong Hin Constance [2006] 2 SLR 24 held at 
[92] that when a lie offers corroboration, it does that by 
corroborating some existing evidence. Although there are 
several other local cases which may suggest that lies can 
corroborate guilt, in all those cases Lucas was cited and there 
were other evidence for the courts’ consideration. Thus, “Lucas 
is not to be construed to mean that an accused person can be 
convicted because he had lied. The true effect of Lucas is that a 
person’s lies may corroborate other evidence against him, and 
the corroborated evidence may establish his guilt. Lies are not 
evidence of guilt.” 
Some brief observations on the case 
Two observations will be made: the first being a fairly narrow one, and 
the second a much broader one. First, Justice Kan’s decision (and the 
affirmation by the Court of Appeal) is a welcome one insofar as it 
attempts to clarify that the corroborative effect of lies, in the light of 
seemingly conflicting local case law, needs to be properly understood. 
However, there may be a question of whether his proposition may have 
been an overstatement.  
According to the literal words of point (c) above, lies cannot and can 
never be evidence of guilt. One suspects though, even if only on a 
plainly logical view, that what Justice Kan probably means to say is that 
an accused person cannot be convicted on the sole basis of his lies, and 
while lies can evidence guilt by the indirect way of corroboration, lies 
themselves do not and cannot form the sole evidentiary foundation of 
guilt. Indeed, although Justice Kan maintains that the local cases do not 
in effect say that Lucas means lies can corroborate guilt (as opposed to 
evidence), some of these cases have been categorically characterised 
otherwise.3 Elsewhere, Lucas has been described as such: 
The Lucas direction on the use of lies as corroboration appears to 
have been developed to meet two important concerns [one of which 
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is] the risk that the jury will reason that any lie goes to prove guilt… 
[this concern] is met by the requirement that the lie be a deliberate 
one on a material issue and motivated by guilt...4 
In other words, a material lie motivated by material guilt can 
corroboratively prove guilt. It is also ironic that the premise of lies 
corroborating guilt is rejected, because that seems to be exactly what 
has happened in this case – the Court of Appeal noted at [19] of its 
decision that “the circumstantial evidence adduced by the Prosecution 
was so strong that, even if the Appellant had kept silent on the matters 
on which he was found to have lied, it would have been sufficient to 
prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Thus, given that guilt had 
already been established without resort to the lies, the practical effect of 
the lies was to corroborate not only existing evidence but also guilt. 
Perhaps all of this is just unhelpful semantics that is inconsequential, 
and a case can be made for that, albeit as part of a wider assailment 
against the usefulness of corroboration and all its sub-doctrines. That is, 
the exact corroborative effect of lies is a problem symptomatic of the 
unhelpfulness of corroboration as a distinct concept, to which we now 
turn to the second observation.  
Our law on corroboration was once described as incoherent, lacking 
direction and clarity, and the least satisfactory in the rules of evidence.5 
Our Evidence Act6 and Criminal Procedure Code 20107 (and its 
predecessor) only contain “scattered provisions relating to 
corroboration”8 and has had an uncertain relationship with decades 
upon decades of common law developments in corroboration.9 The 
unhappiness with corroboration also resonates in (or should it be said 
partly originates from) other jurisdictions; in DPP v Kilbourne for 
instance, Lord Reid declared that rules on corroboration were 
unnecessarily complex and that common sense sufficed to resolve the 
fundamental issues that confronted evidence10 – and despite sweeping 
reforms subsequent to this, pockets of discontent still exist vis-à-vis 
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whether corroboration is predominantly an epistemic matter.11 Locally, 
in Tang Kin Seng v PP, Yong CJ held that in determining if 
corroboration is required, the court will assess if a conviction is unsafe 
based on existing evidence – if it is not, it will “identify which aspect of 
it is not so convincing and for which supporting evidence is required or 
desired… All these would… have to be done in the light of all the 
circumstances of each case and all the evidence… as well as 
accumulated knowledge of human behaviour and common sense.”12  
Corroboration’s function then, is nothing more than ensuring that, on 
the facts of the case, there is sufficient quality in the evidence to convict 
(based on the assumptive but accepted standard of beyond a reasonable 
doubt). And by quality, it means possessing the dual attributes of 
reliability and relevance (with no premium placed on one over the 
other),13 attributes that best comport with the principles, policies, and 
purposes of our Evidence Act. Seen in this light, the gravitation towards 
corroboration is the same in every case: in a civil case, for the plaintiff 
to prevail the judge wants to be satisfied that there is sufficient (in a 
qualitative sense) evidence on a balance of probabilities; in a criminal 
case, for the prosecution to prevail the judge wants to be satisfied that 
there is sufficient (also in a qualitative sense) evidence that proves guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. If the factual narrative does not hold water 
because there are doubts of some sort at something, more evidence is 
needed. Corroboration is but a fanciful word for that process. 
Corroboration as a distinct concept or a requirement is superfluous.  
It is thus strange that corroboration – whichever facet of it – is still 
talked about in its technical and rigid sense when virtually all of which 
that was technical about it has been discredited or abandoned. 
Specifically, the classic situations of the mandatory need to dispense the 
R v Baskerville14 warning, the need for corroboration for child 
witnesses,15 and the need for corroboration for victims of sexual 
offences.16 It may be said that corroboration still has a role to play in a 
few other types of situations, such as distressed victims, inconsistent 
statements, collusion, identification evidence, the silence of the 
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accused, and of course the lies of the accused.17 But a common thread 
runs through all of these situations: on the facts and on the prevailing 
science and knowledge of the day, does the court have a logical reason 
to believe a piece of evidence is unreliable or irrelevant? Bearing in 
mind that the common law rules of corroboration have largely 
developed in the context of jury-based systems, wherein the judges are 
tasked to give specific instructions to juries on how to think about the 
evidence, any remaining importance of such rules are further 
diminished in light of the fact that our fact-finders (judges) determine 
admissibility, relevance, and weight all at the same time. That being the 
case, it becomes much clearer how the quality of evidence can be better 
evaluated. 
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